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Abstract
We construct a dynamic Ricardian model of trade with money and nominal ex-
change rate. The model implies that the nominal wages of the trading countries are
more likely to exhibit stronger positive comovements when the countries ﬁx their bi-
lateral exchange rates. Panel regression results based on data from OECD countries
from 1973 to 2012 suggest that countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU) ex-
perienced stronger positive wage comovements with their main trade partners. When
we restrict the regression to the subsample of the EMU countries, we ﬁnd a signif-
icant increase in wage comovements after these countries joined the EMU in 1999
compared to the pre-euro era. In comparison, when the sample is restricted to the
non-EMU countries, we ﬁnd no evidence that non-currency union pegs aﬀected the
wage comovements.
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1 Introduction
Nominal wages and exchange rates are important factors in international trade. However,
typical Ricardian models of trade are real models and thus do not explicitly deal with
the monetary aspects of trade such as changes in nominal wage and exchange rate, albeit
Dornbusch et al. (1977) and Ito and Ohyama (1985) point out that it is possible to extend
the discussion of the standard Ricardian model to include these nominal variables. Thus
in this paper, we construct a dynamic Ricardian model with money and nominal exchange
rate. We borrow the elements of a Ricardian trade model and market structure from
Dornbusch et al. (1977), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Levchenko and Zhang (2011),
and the elements of money and exchange rate from Chari et al. (2002).
From our model, we obtain an interesting theoretical prediction regarding the eﬀects
of exchange rate regimes and trade on the comovements of nominal wages: if a country
ﬁxes the exchange rate with its main trade partner, then its wage will comove strongly
and positively with its partner’s wage.1 Intuitively, a ﬁxed exchange rate implies that
the two countries have similar growth rates in money supplies that then lead to similar
growth rates in nominal wages. However, if a country ﬂoats the exchange rate, then its
wage does not necessarily comove with that of its main trade partner, as the exchange rate
can adjust to maintain the relative wages and prices. Thus the model predicts stronger
comovements of wages between countries that ﬁx their bilateral exchange rates.
In practice, many countries adopt ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, with the extreme
case being a currency union. In the 1990s, among the 91 economies studied by Sterne
(1999), the number of countries adopting an explicit exchange rate target increased from
30 to 47. In 1999, the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) locked in 11
European countries committed to a single currency, and the EMU has been expanding
1Our interests are in the comovements of nominal wages, so in the following discussion the word
“wage(s)” refers to nominal wage(s), unless otherwise noted.
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since. However, in the wake of recent crises in peripheral countries in the EMU, economic
commentators (for instance Economist, 2010) suggest that relative to Germany, countries
such as Greece and Ireland have wages that are too high for their products to be competi-
tive internationally. Yet, as EMU members, they do not have the option of devaluation to
promote their products. Such observations suggest that for countries in a currency union
and countries adopting currency pegs, whether their wages align with those of their main
trade partners has important economic consequences.
To the best of our knowledge, however, no previous studies have examined theoret-
ically or empirically the eﬀects of exchange rate regimes and trade on wage comovements
between countries. Our paper now ﬁlls this void by constructing a model of exchange rate,
trade, and wage comovements, and by testing the model’s central prediction that wages
comove strongly and positively between trading countries that peg their currencies. The
results of panel regressions based on data from 24 OECD countries from 1973 to 2012
suggest that if a country and its main trade partner were in the EMU, then their wages
experienced stronger comovements. We also run regressions with the sample restricted
to EMU countries to determine whether joining the EMU in 1999 was associated with
stronger positive wage comovements. We ﬁnd that for EMU countries, there was a sig-
niﬁcant increase in wage comovements after joining the EMU, compared to the pre-euro
era. Meanwhile, for the non-EMU countries, there is no evidence that non-currency-union
pegs strengthened the positive wage comovements.
Our paper thus makes the following contributions to the trade and wage literature,
the exchange rate and wage literature, the nominal wage comovement literature, and the
nominal anchor literature. First, our paper adds to the large literature on the wage eﬀects
of trade. The well-known factor price equalization theorem of the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O)
model of trade claims that through the convergence of the relative prices of goods, trade
causes the convergence of the relative prices of labor and capital between the trading
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countries.2 Many studies also analyze the eﬀects of trade on the relative wage of skilled
and unskilled labor. While the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of the H-O model claims that
trade causes the relative wage to increase in a skill-abundant country but decrease in a
skill-scarce country, some studies such as Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Acemoglu (2003),
and Kurokawa (2011) claim that trade can cause the relative wage to increase in both of the
trading countries.3 These arguments use real models of trade to analyze the wage eﬀects
of trade. However, by incorporating money and exchange rate into the Ricardian model,
our paper reveals that the eﬀects of trade on the nominal wage comovements between
the trading countries are diﬀerent under the ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rate regimes. To
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to use a Ricardian model to analyze the
relationship between exchange rates and wage comovements.
Second, our paper also adds to the literature on the relationship between exchange
rates and wages. While many studies have linked real exchange rates to real wages (e.g.
Goldberg and Tracy 2000; Campa and Goldberg 2001), our paper now links nominal
exchange rates to nominal wages and provides new theoretical and empirical insights
regarding the relationship between exchange rates and wages.
Third, our results also add to the knowledge of nominal wage comovements. Many
previous studies analyze the comovements of macro variables. For example, there is a large
literature on the comovements between exchange rates and other macro variables (e.g.
Stockman, 1987; Baxter and Stockman, 1989; Flood and Rose, 1995; Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ,
1995a; Stockman, 1998; Kollmann, 2001; Chari et al., 2002; Duarte et al., 2007). Surpris-
ingly, however, there are few studies that analyze the comovements of nominal wages. In
fact, as far as we are aware, there are only three studies on the subject. The ﬁrst, Budd
2See Samuelson (1948) and Lerner (1952) for a proof of the theorem.
3For example, see Feenstra and Hanson (2003), Kremer and Maskin (2006), Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2007), Chusseau et al. (2008), Harrison et al. (2012), and Kurokawa (2012) for a survey on trade and
wage inequality.
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et al. (2002), highlights the comovements of nominal wages within a multinational. They
show the existence of comovements of nominal wages within a multinational ﬁrm through
internal risk sharing. The second, Robertson (2000), highlights the comovements of nom-
inal wages between the interior and border regions in a country. He provides evidence for
these comovements between the interior and border regions of Mexico, thus indicating that
the wage impact of emigration is transmitted to the overall Mexican economy. The third,
Lamo, Perez and Schuknecht (2008), highlights the comovements of nominal wages across
sectors within a country. They show strong positive comovements of public and private
sector nominal wages over business cycles since the 1960s in the euro area and a number
of other OECD countries.4 While these previous works focus on inter- and intra-country
nominal wage comovements due to internal risk sharing within a multinational ﬁrm and
emigration, we highlight that for countries that engage extensively in trade, the choice of
a ﬁxed exchange rate regime will enhance nominal wage comovements between countries.
Fourth, our results also add to the knowledge of how an exchange rate peg acts as
a nominal anchor. A currency peg or membership of a monetary union is one way to
provide a nominal anchor for a country’s output prices or inﬂation rate (Edwards, 1993;
Calvo and Vegh, 1994; Willett, 1998). Our results suggest that in addition to providing
a nominal anchor for output prices or the inﬂation rate, a monetary union can provide a
nominal anchor for wages.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct a dynamic
Ricardian model with money and nominal exchange rate and derive the predictions on
wage comovements. We present supporting empirical evidence in Section 3. Section 4
concludes by oﬀering a brief discussion of the results.
4Lamo et al. (2008) also study causal linkages between public and private sector wages, i.e. the pub-
lic/private wage leadership. Their causality analysis suggests that although inﬂuences from the private
sector appear on the whole to be stronger, there are direct and indirect feedback eﬀects from public wage
setting in a number of countries as well. See the references in their paper for studies on wage leadership
in a particular country (mainly Sweden plus a few others).
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2 Theory
In this section, we construct a dynamic Ricardian model of trade with money and nominal
exchange rate and thus address the monetary aspects of trade. The setup of the model
borrows from two main sources, ﬁrst, the Ricardian models (Dornbusch et al., 1977; Eaton
and Kortum, 2002; Levchenko and Zhang, 2011), and second, models of money and ex-
change rates (Chari et al., 2002). The model in our paper is highly stylized, but it allows us
to obtain analytic solutions, and clear insights about the eﬀects of exchange rate regimes
and trade on wage comovements.
2.1 Model setup
There are two countries, home and foreign. The variables associated with the foreign
country are indicated by a superscript ∗. Each country is capable of producing the same
continuum of traded goods. The traded goods are indexed by 푖, and 푖 ∈ [0, 1]. Each
country also produces a non-traded good, respectively.
The period preference for home country’s representative consumer is (note that the
time subscript 푡 is suppressed, wherever possible)
푈푡 =
퐶1−휁푡





















and 휁, 휒, 휅 and 훾 > 0. The period budget constraint is
∫ 1
0
푃푖푡퐶푖푡푑푖+ 푃푧푡퐶푧푡 +푀푡 +
∑
푠
푞푡+1(푠푡+1)퐵푡+1(푠푡+1) = 푊푡퐿푡 +푀푡−1 +퐵푡 + Π푡 + 푇푡.
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Here, 퐶푖 denotes the consumption of traded good 푖 in the home country, 퐶푧 is the con-
sumption of the non-traded good in the home country. The quantity 퐿 is labor in the
home country. The variables 푀 and 푃 are money supply and the aggregate price level.
The variables 푃푖, 푃푧, and 푊 are the nominal price of traded good 푖, the nominal price
of non-traded good, and nominal wage. The variables 푞푡+1(푠푡+1) and 퐵푡+1(푠푡+1) are the
price and the quantity of a nominal bond that pays one unit of home currency in state
푠 in period 푡 + 1, and zero otherwise. Lastly, Π and 푇 are proﬁts of home ﬁrms and
a nominal transfer from the home government. Because our focus is on wages, we drop
physical capital for the basic model, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
Given the prices 푃푖푡 and 푃푧푡, the minimization of the cost of 퐶푡 yields the following













푞푡+1(푠푡+1)퐵푡+1(푠푡+1) = 푊푡퐿푡 +푀푡−1 +퐵푡 + Π푡 + 푇푡. (2)
The production technology in the home country is
푌푖푡 = 퐴푖푡퐿푖푡, (3)
푌푧푡 = 퐴푧푡퐿푧푡, (4)
where 퐴푖푡 and 퐴푧푡 are the stochastic productivities. The market for each traded good is
perfectly competitive. The home producers of good 푖 will have to compete with the foreign
producer of ﬁrm 푖. Home and foreign consumers only buy from the producers with the
lowest price, and there is no shipping cost.
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Given the linear production technology and perfect competition, the local-currency
prices charged by home and foreign producers of good 푖 are














where 푒푡 is the nominal exchange rate, deﬁned as the price of foreign currency in home
currency. We order the varieties 푖 such that 퐴푖푡/퐴
∗
푖푡 is decreasing in 푖. As in Dornbusch
et al. (1977), we assume that 퐴푖푡/퐴
∗
푖푡 is strictly decreasing in 푖. Let 푘 ∈ [0, 1] be the
cutoﬀ variety for which 푃퐻푘푡 = 푒푡푃
퐹
푘푡. Then the home country will produce all varieties
with indices 푖 < 푘, and the foreign country will produce all variety with 푖 > 푘. We
assume that both countries produce good 푘 and there is no international trade of the
variety 푘. The market for non-traded goods is also perfectly competitive. Consequently,
the local-currency prices for the nontraded goods are
푃푧푡 = 푊푡/퐴푧푡, (7)





As in Chari et al. (2002), money is introduced into the utility function. The money
supplies in the two countries follow stochastic processes, to be speciﬁed in later subsections
for diﬀerent exchange rate regimes. Any new money balance 푀푡 −푀푡−1 is distributed to
households through lumpsum transfer. That is, 푇푡 = 푀푡−푀푡−1. The real exchange rate is
determined by the ratio of home and foreign marginal utility of consumption, see equation
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(14) of Chari et al. (2002). Unlike Chari et al. (2002), our focus is not on nominal price
rigidity. Hence, we assume ﬂexible prices.
At the beginning of each period, both money shocks and productivity shocks are
observed by all players in the economy. Then ﬁrms post prices, consumers make purchase
decisions, production occurs, and markets clear.
The market clearing conditions are
∫ 푘
0







푌푖푡 = 퐶푖푡 + 퐶
∗
푖푡 ∀푖 < 푘, (11)
푌 ∗푖푡 = 퐶푖푡 + 퐶
∗
푖푡 ∀푖 > 푘, (12)













2.2 Characterizing the solution
For the household’s maximization problem, the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to 퐶푖푡,













휅퐿훾푡 = 푊푡휆푡, (17)
휒ℎ′(푀푡/푃푡)
푃푡
= 휆푡 − 훽퐸푡휆푡+1, (18)
훽퐸푡휆푡+1(푠푡+1) = 푞푡+1(푠푡+1) ⋅ 휆푡. (19)
An equivalent approach is to maximize the household’s utility with respect to equation
(2). The ﬁrst order condition with respect to the aggregate consumption 퐶푡 is
퐶−휁푡 = 푃푡휆푡, (20)
while other ﬁrst order conditions are identical.
To determine the equilibrium exchange rate, we follow the argument of Chari et al.
(2002). First, we use the 푠푡 notation and rewrite equations (20) and (19) to explicitly





훽휋(푠푡∣푠푡−1)휆(푠푡) = 푞(푠푡∣푠푡−1)휆(푠푡−1). (22)
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Because the payments of the set of home nominal bonds are state contingent, adding
foreign nominal bonds will not add to the structure of ﬁnancial market. Therefore, the
foreign household will be happy to buy just the home bonds. For the foreign household,
the pricing of the home nominal bonds must satisfy




















Bringing equation (25) back one period and substituting it into (25) to eliminate
푈푐(푠푡−1)















































푃 ∗푡 (퐶∗푡 )휁
훿. (28)





which states that the exchange rate is equal to the ratio of marginal utility of nominal
wealth in the two countries.
Next, we state two lemmas useful for the proof of Proposition 1 that gives the general
relationship between growth in home and foreign nominal wages.

















Using these equations to eliminate 퐶푧푡, 푃푧푡, and 휆푡 from equation (16), we have

















































∀ 푖 < 푘.



















1− 휖 . (34)
Using equation (34) to eliminate
∫ 푘
0 퐿푖푡푑푖 from equation (9), we have
퐿푧푡 = (1− 휖)퐿푡.
























[휖−휖(1− 휖)휖−1](∫ 10 (푃 ∗푖푡)1−휂푑푖) 11−휂 휖(푃 ∗푧푡)1−휖
[휖−휖(1− 휖)휖−1](∫ 10 푃 1−휂푖푡 푑푖) 11−휂 휖(푃푧푡)1−휖 .
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Note that the price of traded good 푖 in the foreign currency is
푃 ∗푖푡 = 푃푖푡/푒푡 ∀푖,












































































































































We now derive Proposition 1 regarding the relationship between the home and for-
eign nominal wage movements.



































Using equation (29) to eliminate 휆푡 and 휆
∗


































where the last equality follows from equation (41). Substituting equation (39) into the



















































































































The relationship between the home and foreign nominal wage movements obtained
in Proposition 1 is quite general, because we do not need any assumption on the functional
form of the utility from real balance, on the stochastic processes of productivities, or on
the stochastic processes of money supplies. Based on Proposition 1, we make three obser-
vations. First, if the exchange rate is ﬁxed, then the home wage growth is equal to foreign
wage growth multiplied by a positive stochastic random variable, which is a function of
the relative productivity growth in the nontraded goods, (퐴푧푡/퐴푧푡−1)/(퐴∗푧푡/퐴∗푧푡−1).
Second, if 휁 > 1, then the fraction
훾(1− 휖)(1− 휁)
훾(1− 휖) + 휁(1 + 훾휖) (46)
is negative. When the exchange rate is ﬁxed, the sign of the fraction implies that if the
home productivity growth in nontraded goods is faster than the foreign, then growth in
home wage will be lower than the foreign wage growth.
Third, if 휁 = 1, i.e. the utility with respect to consumption has log form, then













In the previous subsection, we have derived the relationship between the home and foreign
nominal wage movements. In this subsection, we explicitly show that wage comovements
are stronger under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, by further assuming that utility of real
balance and productivities are given by
∙ (a) ℎ(푀푡/푃푡) = 푙푛(푀푡/푃푡).
∙ (b) the productivities are
퐴푖푡 = 퐴푖푒푥푝(푎(푡) + 푢푡),












where 푎(푡), 푎푧(푡), 푎
∗(푡), and 푎∗푧(푡) are deterministic functions of time that describe




푡 are iid shocks with zero
means.
Regarding the money supplies, we assume that
∙ (c1) when the exchange rate is ﬂexible, the home and foreign money supplies follow
the stochastic process







where 푔 and 푔∗ are constants, and 휇푡 and 휇∗푡 are zero-mean iid shocks with a common
cdf Φ(휇).
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where 푔∗ is a constant, and 휇∗푡 is a zero-mean iid shock with the cdf Φ(휇∗). The
home country sets 푀푡 to ﬁx the exchange rate.
Under assumptions (a) and (c1), we ﬁrst solve for the marginal utilities of nominal
wealth 휆푡, and 휆
∗
푡 , before deriving the results on wage comovements.










where 휓 and 휓∗ are constants.
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푀∗푡 푒푥푝(휇∗푡+1)(1 + 푔∗)
) + 훽2퐸푡(
휒




푀∗푡 푒푥푝(휇∗푡+1)푒푥푝(휇∗푡+2)푒푥푝(휇∗푡+3)(1 + 푔∗)3




























































푑Φ(휇∗) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
]
.







푀∗푡−1푒푥푝(휇∗푡 )(1 + 푔∗)
.
The expression for 휆푡 can be obtained similarly. ■





















훾(1− 휖)(1− 휁) + 휁(1 + 훾) )[(Δ푎푧(푡)−Δ푎
∗




where Δ푎푧(푡) = 푎푧(푡)−푎푧(푡−1) and Δ푎∗푧(푡) = 푎∗푧(푡)−푎∗푧(푡−1). Without loss of generality,
we can normalize 푊푡−1 to be 1, and set 푣푡−1 = 푣∗푡−1 = 0. Therefore, as long as we can
ﬁnd the expression of 푊 ∗푡 in terms of state variables and shocks, we can ﬁnd the home
and foreign wage growth as functions of state variables and shocks.
Thus, under assumptions (a) and (b), we next solve for 푊 ∗푡 .
Lemma 4. Under assumptions (a) and (b), the wage growth rates in the home and foreign
countries are explicit functions of shocks and state variables.






















where the second equality follows from Lemma 1. Note that the foreign version of equation




































































































































훾(1− 휖)(1− 휁)(1− 휂)
훾(1− 휖) + 휁(1 + 훾휖) (Δ푎푧(푡)−Δ푎
∗








































훾(1− 휖)(1− 휁)(1− 휂)
훾(1− 휖) + 휁(1 + 훾휖) (Δ푎푧(푡)−Δ푎
∗
















퐴∗푧푒푥푝(푎∗푧(푡) + 푣∗푡 )
]
훾(1−휖)(휁−1)

























훾(1− 휖)(1− 휁)(1− 휂)
훾(1− 휖) + 휁(1 + 훾휖) (Δ푎푧(푡)−Δ푎
∗





















Rearranging the last equation and normalizing 푊 ∗푡−1 to be one yield
푊∗푡
푊∗푡−1











훾(1− 휖)(1− 휁)(1− 휂)
훾(1− 휖) + 휁(1 + 휖훾) (Δ푎푧(푡)−Δ푎
∗



























































푒푥푝[− 훾(1− 휖)(1− 휁)(1− 휂)
훾(1− 휖) + 휁(1 + 휖훾) (Δ푎푧(푡)−Δ푎
∗















































(1 + 푔∗)푒푥푝(휇∗푡 )
. (56)
If the exchange rate is ﬁxed, 푒푡/푒푡−1 = 1. ■
In each of equations (54) and (55), the ﬁrst line is the eﬀect of monetary factors
on wage growth, which we will refer to as the monetary eﬀects. The second and third
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lines are the eﬀects of the productivity shocks through the prices of traded goods. The
fourth line is the eﬀect of the productivity shocks to nontraded sectors, through the price
of nontraded goods. We will refer to the second, the third and the fourth lines as the
productivity eﬀects. The ﬁfth line contains constants that depend on parameters and past
values of endogenous variables. Assume that 휁 > 1 and 휂 > 1, i.e. the relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient and the elasticity of substitution between traded goods are greater than 1. The
assumptions imply
훾(1− 휖)(1− 휁)(1− 휂)
훾(1− 휖) + 휁(1 + 휖훾) > 0,
휖(휁 − 1)




Here, we make a few more observations on the relationship between wage and pro-
ductivities. First, 푊푡/푊푡−1 is decreasing in 푢푡 and 푢∗푡 , the productivity shocks associated
with home and foreign traded goods. The intuition is that when productivities improve,
output prices will tend to drop. Consequently, a lower nominal wage is required to solicit
suﬃcient labor supply. This is why increases in 푢푡 and 푢
∗
푡 lead to lower wages.
Second, 푊푡/푊푡−1 is increasing in 푣푡− 푣∗푡 , the relative productivity shock associated
with the home nontraded goods. Note that the relative productivity shock 푣푡 − 푣∗푡 raises
the price of the imported varieties in the home country (see the term associated with
the second integral in equation (55)). This term shows up in the prices of traded goods
because to eliminate 푊 ∗푡 , we use equation (40), which can be traced back to equations
(37) and (28). When productivity in home nontraded good sector improves faster than
the foreign, home price of nontraded good and hence home wage will drop faster. This
makes the imported goods more expensive because the foreign wage is higher relative to
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the home wage. This eﬀect can be viewed as the eﬀects of productivities in nontraded
goods on the relative prices of traded goods.
Third, the overall eﬀect of 푣푡 on 푊푡/푊푡−1 is ambiguous. From the third line of
equation (55), we can see that the direct eﬀect of 푣푡 to 푊푡/푊푡−1 is negative because it
lowers the price of the nontraded good in home. Therefore, combined with the previous
observation, the overall eﬀect of 푣푡 is ambiguous.
By symmetry, similar observations hold for the foreign country.
We now derive Proposition 2 regarding wage comovements under diﬀerent exchange
rate regimes.
Proposition 2. Assume that both monetary shocks are independent from the productivity
shocks. Wage comovements between the countries are more positive or less negative under
the ﬁxed exchange rate regime (assumptions (a), (b) and (c2)), compared to the ﬂexible
exchange rate regime (assumptions (a), (b) and (c1)).
Proof: We maintain the normalization 푊푡−1 = 1. Substituting equation (54) back
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To reduce notation clusters, deﬁne
푒푥푝[푑푡(푣푡, 푣푡∗)] = 푒푥푝[ 훾(1− 휖)(1− 휁)
훾(1− 휖) + 휁 + 휁휖훾 (Δ푎푧(푡)−Δ푎
∗
푧(푡) + 푣푡 − 푣∗푡 )],
푒푥푝[푓푡(푢푡, 푢
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such that the random variables 푑푡 and 푓푡 are functions of the underlying productivity





) = 푙푛(1 + 푔∗) + 휇∗푡 + 푑푡 + 푓푡.





(1 + 푔∗)푒푥푝(휇∗푡 )
.




) = 푙푛(1 + 푔) + 휇푡 + 푑푡 + 푓푡.




) = 푙푛(1 + 푔∗) + 휇∗푡 + 푓푡.
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Therefore, under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the correlation coeﬃcient between








푐표푣(휇∗푡 + 푑푡 + 푓푡, 휇∗푡 + 푓푡)
[푣푎푟(휇∗푡 + 푑푡 + 푓푡)]
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where the second equality follows from the assumption that both monetary shocks are
independent from the productivity shocks. Under the ﬂexible regime, the correlation
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where the last equality follows from assumption (c1), which states that the monetary
shocks have the same marginal distributions. Because 푣푎푟(휇푡 − 휇∗푡 ) ≥ 0 implies
푣푎푟(휇푡) + 푣푎푟(휇
∗
푡 ) ≥ 2 ⋅ 푐표푣(휇푡, 휇∗푡 ),
or
















푣푎푟(휇∗푡 )− 푐표푣(휇푡, 휇∗푡 )
[푣푎푟(휇∗푡 ) + 푣푎푟(푑푡 + 푓푡)]
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where the strict equality holds only when 휇푡 and 휇
∗
푡 are perfectly correlated. ■
Intuitively, when the exchange rate regime is ﬁxed, the comovements between home
and foreign wages are caused by both the identical monetary eﬀects (푙푛(1 + 푔∗)푒푥푝(휇∗푡 ))
and the correlation in the productivity eﬀects. Under the ﬂexible exchange rate regime, the
monetary eﬀects in the two countries are not correlated, unless the monetary shocks are
correlated. In this case, the comovements in wages will be weaker because the comovements
are caused by only the correlation in productivity eﬀects.
Finally, we obtain the following corollary for the case of 휁 = 1.
Corollary 1. Under assumption (a), and if 휁 = 1 (i.e. the utility from consumption has
the log form), then
푊 ∗푡
푊 ∗푡−1






(1 + 푔∗)푒푥푝(휇∗푡 ),
and the wage comovements are perfectly positive under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. Under


































= 푒푥푝(휇∗푡 )(1 + 푔
∗). (58)









Substituting equation (58) into the above, we obtain
푊푡
푊푡−1











= 푒푥푝(휇∗푡 )(1 + 푔
∗),
which indicates perfect comovements.
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If the exchange rate is ﬂexible, by substituting equation (56) into (59), we have
푊푡
푊푡−1
= 푒푥푝(휇푡)(1 + 푔). (60)
Equations (58) and (60) indicate that the wage comovements are positive only if 휇∗푡 and
휇푡 are positively correlated. ■
In this case, while the monetary shocks aﬀect changes in wages, the productivities
do not. The productivities aﬀect only quantities of consumption and trade. Thus, as
argued by Duarte et al. (2007), the relationship between nominal exchange rates and
macroeconomic variables may depend on the nature of shocks.
In this section, we have constructed a dynamic Ricardian model with money and
nominal exchange rate. The model implies that if the exchange rate with a trade partner
is ﬁxed, then the wage in the home country will have stronger positive comovements with
that of the trade partner. On the other hand, if the exchange rate with the trade partner
is ﬂoating, then the wage in the home country does not necessarily comove with that of
the trade partner due to the ﬂexibility in the exchange rate. The key mechanism is the
following. In each country, a change in nominal wage is linked directly to the change in
money supply. When the exchange rate is ﬁxed, the growth rates in money supplies must
be equal in the two countries, implying a common growth rate in nominal wages in the
two countries. Meanwhile, when the exchange rate is ﬂexible, money growth rates and
wage growth rates in the two countries are not correlated in general. 5
5Note that the key predictions developed here also hold in the framework of the standard static Ricardian
model, and in the standard H-O model. For the argument in a static Ricardian model, see the earlier version
of this paper Kurokawa et al. (2011). In the standard H-O model, by incorporating a nominal exchange
rate and using the factor price equalization theorem, we obtain 푊 = 푒푊 ∗ and 푅 = 푒푅∗, where 푅 and
푅∗ are the home and foreign rentals, respectively. Thus it is obvious that under the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime, the home and foreign wages 푊 and 푊 ∗ would comove strongly and positively.
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3 Empirical Evidence
To test our theory, we will empirically examine the comovements between the wage growth
rates of a country and its trade partner and how the wage comovements may be aﬀected
by the exchange rate regime. To be speciﬁc, Proposition 2 states a key testable prediction
that the wage comovements are stronger under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime than under a
ﬂoating regime.
3.1 Regression speciﬁcation
In this subsection, we derive from our theory the regression speciﬁcation that guides our




































Because of the observed productivity slow-down since the 1970s, we posit that the pro-
ductivities have quadratic trends. To be speciﬁc, we assume that
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The terms (휎1−휎∗1−휎2+휎∗2) and 2(휎2−휎∗2)⋅푡 capture the diﬀerence between two countries’
quadratic trends in productivities of nontraded goods. In a panel regression framework,
(휎1 − 휎∗1 − 휎2 + 휎∗2) is constant for a country and its main economic partner. Therefore,
the last equation implies the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects in regressions. The term (휎2−휎∗2) ⋅ 푡
indicates the existence of a linear trend in the diﬀerence of home and foreign wage growth
rates, and this trend is speciﬁc to a country and its main economic partner. The term
(푣푡 − 푣∗푡 ) is a zero-mean random variable that exhibits ﬁrst order autocorrelation. This
term is absorbed into the error term of regressions.
Equation (62), which is derived from Proposition 1 and the assumption of quadratic
productivity trends, suggests the following linear relationship between home wage, foreign








) + 훼2 ⋅ 푙푛( 푒푖푡
푒푖푡−1
) + 훼3,푖 ⋅ 푑푖 ⋅ 푡+ 휔푖 + 휖푖푡.
Moreover, because Proposition 2 states that the wage comovements will be stronger under
the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, we include the interaction term between ﬁxed exchange













+ 훽3 ⋅ 푙푛( 푒푖푡
푒푖푡−1
) + 훽4,푖 ⋅ 푑푖 ⋅ 푡+ 휔푖 + 휖푖푡, (63)
where 푊푖푡 is the wage index of country 푖, 푊
∗
푖푡 is the wage index for the main economic
partner of country 푖, and 푒푖푡 is the nominal exchange rate between country 푖 and its main
economic partner. The indicator variable 푝푒푔푖푡 is equal to 1 if a country 푖 pegs its exchange
rate to its base country, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The variable 푑푖 is an indicator
variable for country 푖, and hence 푑푖 ⋅ 푡 corresponds to the term (휎2 − 휎∗2) ⋅ 푡 in equation
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(62), the linear time trend in wage diﬀerences speciﬁc to a country and its main economic
partner. The variable 휔푖 is the ﬁxed eﬀect for country 푖 that corresponds to the term
(휎1 − 휎∗1 − 휎2 + 휎∗2) in equation (62). The quantity 휖푖푡 is the error term. 훽0, 훽1, 훽2, 훽3,
and 훽4 are coeﬃcients to be estimated.
Our intention is to use the regression analysis to estimate partial correlation between
home and foreign wage growth rates under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes. We do not
intend to identify causality between the wages because they are equilibrium objects. In
particular, the coeﬃcient 훽1 measures the wage comovements between a country and its
partner when the exchange rate is ﬂexible. Meanwhile, 훽2 measures the additional wage
comovements experienced by countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime relative to those
with a ﬂoating regime. The sum 훽1 + 훽2 is thus the aggregate wage comovements for
countries with a ﬁxed regime. Proposition 2 is substantiated if 훽2 > 0.
Because our speciﬁcation incorporates quadratic trends in productivity, the wage
comovements that we examine empirically are the cyclical ﬂuctuations in wages around
trends.
3.2 Data
Our regression analysis uses wage data from the OECD Library (www.oecd-ilibrary.org),
which provides detailed wage information of OECD countries starting from 1973. Wage is
measured by the index for nominal hourly earnings in manufacturing sectors. Our choice
of wage measurement, identical to that in Levchenko and Zhang (2011), is consistent with
the theory that requires a country-speciﬁc measure for wage.
The classiﬁcation of the exchange rate regime follows Klein and Shambaugh (2006),
who determine whether a country pegs its currency to the base country, based on the
volatility of the exchange rate. In Klein and Shambaugh (2006), country 푖’s base country
is the country to which country 푖 pegs its exchange rate or the country with which country
34
푖 has the most signiﬁcant trade relationship. For each country in the sample, we use base
countries identiﬁed by Klein and Shambaugh (2006) as its main economic partner.6
In our model, we implicitly assume that the exchange rate peg is credible. However,
in practice non-currency-union pegs often lack credibility compared to the currency union
(Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1995b).7 Historically, countries had been known to break their pegs
and devalue when the prices of their products were not competitive internationally. If
producers expect such devaluations, then there are smaller incentives to align wages to
the base country. In contrast, being in a currency union constitutes a credible exchange
rate peg to other union members as the same currency is used by all countries in the union
and it is costly to exit the union. It is thus possible that these two types of pegs have
diﬀerent eﬀects on wage comovements. Therefore, in many regressions, we redeﬁne the
peg regime to be the currency union and interact the peg indicator with the foreign wage
growth. In such regressions, the reference group include countries that adopt a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime and countries that engage in non-currency-union pegs. We argue
that these two types of countries are similar in the sense that ﬂexibility in exchange rate,
to diﬀerent extents, is expected.
The countries included in our sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
and the UK. The US is not in the sample because the US does not have a dominant trade-
partner to be used as the base country. Because we are looking at OECD countries, the
currency union is the EMU. Our sample covers data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1973 to the
fourth quarter of 2012. The details about the base country, episodes of exchange rate
pegs, and data range for each country are documented in Table 1. We report summary
6The description of their data can be found at www.dartmouth.edu/˜jshambau/
7As Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995b) mention, Eichengreen (1994), Obstfeld (1985), and Svensson (1994)
argue that ﬁxed exchange rates are inherently fragile.
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statistics in Table 2.
3.3 Main regression results
We run regressions with growth rates of wages calculated over diﬀerent time intervals. This
is because our model assumes perfect wage ﬂexibility that is more likely to be true in the
long run, and regressions over diﬀerent time intervals will reveal whether the prediction of
the model is more accurate in longer time horizon. The top rows in Table 3 through Table
6 indicate the frequency at which we calculate the growth rates of the wage in country 푖
and its base country. We choose to use the wage growth over a quarter, a year, two years,
and four years.
Table 3 reports the wage comovements under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes. In
this analysis, a country’s exchange rate regime is considered to be ﬁxed if it is a member of
the EMU or engages in a non-currency union peg with its main economic partner (푝푒푔푖푡 =
1). The coeﬃcient on the interaction term (푝푒푔푖푡 × Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡)) is generally insigniﬁcant,
suggesting that Proposition 2 is not supported if both non-currency union pegs and the
EMU are considered as ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
In order to present directly the overall wage comovements of countries with peg
regimes, in the row below the estimated constants in Table 3, we report the coeﬃcient on
the wage growth in the base country (Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡)) when the exchange rate is pegged. This
coeﬃcient is just the sum of 훽1 and 훽2 in Equation (63), or the sum of the coeﬃcients from
the ﬁrst two rows. From this row of coeﬃcients, we see that in general, there is no positive
wage comovements for countries with peg regimes. Overall, Table 3 seems unsupportive to
our hypothesis. As discussed in Section 3.2, however, it may not be appropriate to assume
that the non-currency-union pegs and the monetary union have the same credibility and
combine them to create a single indicator variable for pegs.
Given that being in the EMU is a more credible exchange rate peg than a non-
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currency union peg, we focus on the eﬀects of the EMU and thus deﬁne a new dummy
variable 퐸푀푈푖푡. It is equal to 1 if country 푖 and its base country are both in the EMU in
period 푡, and 0 otherwise. We then repeat the analysis of Table 3 by replacing 푝푒푔푖푡 with
this new dummy variable, and report the results in Table 4. The interaction term between
the EMU indicator and wage growth in the base country (퐸푀푈푖푡 ×Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡)) is always
positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that being in the EMU is associated with stronger
wage comovements. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is also economically meaningful. For
instance, at the quarterly frequency, the coeﬃcient on the interaction between the EMU
indicator and wage growth in the base country is 0.67. This result implies that if the wage
in country 푖’s base country increases by 1%, being in the EMU with the base country
predicts an additional increase of 0.67% in country 푖’s wage relative to the cases where
a country ﬂoats its exchange rate against the base country or engage in a non-currency-
union peg. At the other three frequencies over which we calculate the wage changes, the
coeﬃcients on the interaction term are all signiﬁcant and larger, with coeﬃcient estimates
greater than 1. This is consistent with Proposition 2.
Meanwhile, as indicated by the coeﬃcient of wage growth in the base country
(Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡)) in Tables 3 and 4, if the exchange rate is ﬂexible, wages in general do not
comove positively between a country and its base country. The only exception is the re-
gressions at the quarterly frequency. To conserve space, we do not report the coeﬃcients
on the terms 푑푖 ⋅ 푡 that are country pair-speciﬁc, but they are almost always signiﬁcant
at 5% level. This suggests that there indeed exist diﬀerences in the trend of wage growth
rates among the countries in the sample.
Although in this paper we focus on the eﬀect of trade and exchange rate regimes on
nominal wage comovements, we recognize that capital ﬂow can also lead to comovements of
nominal wages. For instance, as mentioned in the introduction, Budd et al. (2002) suggest
that through internal risk sharing, nominal wages can comove within multinational ﬁrms
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that are necessarily established through foreign direct investment (FDI). Therefore, we
add two variables related to capital ﬂow to the regressions in Table 4. The ﬁrst is the FDI
stock to GDP ratio, and the second is the interaction between the FDI stock to GDP ratio
with the variable 퐸푀푈푖푡. The idea is to check whether the presence of FDI aﬀects nominal
wage growth, particularly for countries in the EMU. In these regressions, the FDI-related
variables are generally not signiﬁcant. Meanwhile, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term
between base country wage growth and the EMU (퐸푀푈푖푡 ×Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡)) remains positive
and signiﬁcant, except that it becomes insigniﬁcant at the annual frequency. To preserve
space, we do not report the results in the paper, but will make them available upon
request.8
3.4 EMU countries vs. non-EMU countries
In Table 5, we repeat the estimations in Table 4 but restrict the sample to countries
currently in the EMU. More speciﬁcally, the countries included are Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spain. The time range remains 1973 to 2012. The purpose of these estimations is to check
whether wage comovements became more positive during the EMU era than the pre-EMU
era. Compared to Table 4, the coeﬃcients on the interaction between the EMU indicator
and the base country wage growth (퐸푀푈푖푡 × Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡)) in Table 5 remain positive and
signiﬁcant. Hence, for the same 11 countries, the positive wage comovements with their
base countries after joining the EMU appear to be stronger than before joining the EMU.
This ﬁnding also supports Proposition 2.
We also run regressions with the countries not in the EMU to examine whether
non-currency union pegs aﬀect wage comovements. The results are presented in Table
8The source of FDI data is the IFS dataset. Because the IFS only provide net ﬂows of FDI, we impute
the FDI stock as the sum of past net ﬂows after subtracting a 10% linear depreciation per year.
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6, and they suggest that non-currency-union pegs have no strengthening eﬀect on wage
comovements in non-EMU countries. Overall, the regression results in Table 5 and Table
6 indicate that the EMU, but not the non-currency-union pegs, is associated with stronger
and positive wage comovements.
4 Conclusion
We have constructed a dynamic Ricardian model of trade with money and nominal ex-
change rate and obtained the prediction that two countries’ nominal wages must exhibit
strong and positive comovements if they ﬁx the bilateral exchange rate. We have used
the data from 24 OECD countries between 1973 and 2012 to test this prediction. We
have found that if a country and its main trade partner were in the EMU, their wages
experienced stronger comovements. Restricting our attention to the EMU members, we
have also found a signiﬁcant increase in wage comovements after they joined the EMU in
1999 compared to the period before 1999. In comparison, when the sample is restricted to
the non-EMU countries, we have found no evidence that non-currency union pegs aﬀected
the wage comovements.
Our results enhance the understanding of wages in international economics in a
number of ways. First, by explicitly introducing money and exchange rate into a Ricardian
trade model, our model suggests that whether a country’s nominal wage comoves with its
main trade partner depends on the type of exchange rate regime. Second, compared to
previous works that emphasize risk-sharing or emigration as the cause of nominal wage
comovements, we highlight that the combination of extensive trade and ﬁxed exchange rate
regime can also drive nominal wage comovements. Third, a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
can provide, to some extent, an anchor for nominal wages, in addition to nominal prices.
In addition, our model is related to the literature on the relationship between the
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relative price of non-traded goods and the bilateral real exchange rate. In two recent
papers on the subject, Betts and Kehoe (2006) and Betts and Kehoe (2008), one of the key
ﬁndings is that for pairs of countries which trade intensively or maintain a stable bilateral
real exchange rate, the relative price of non-traded goods has a stronger relationship with
their bilateral real exchange rate. In the dynamic Ricardian model in our paper, a similar
result holds. It can be shown that when the exchange rate is ﬁxed, the real exchange rate
is determined by the relative price of non-traded goods.9
From a policy perspective, our empirical results are also relevant for the debate over
whether the EMU is an optimum currency area. The existence of wage comovements
suggests that although relative to the US, the EMU originally was less likely to meet
the criteria for optimum currency area (Feenstra and Taylor, 2008, p.879), it may have
enhanced the economic integration of its members via wage comovements.
Finally, it is worth noting that Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2013) have recently
pointed out that there are not enough downward movements of nominal wages in the
Eurozone after the crisis. It indicates that due to this downward nominal wage rigidity,
the nominal wage comovements that we have found in this paper may not contain enough
downward movements.
Appendix: derivation of home wage in Lemma 4
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Table 3: Eﬀects of exchange rate pegs on wage comovements
quarterly annual 2-year 4-year
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) 0.25 -.005 -.11 -.31
(0.1)∗∗ (0.28) (0.33) (0.39)
푝푒푔푖푡 ×Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) -.12 -.27 -.46 -.39
(0.11) (0.17) (0.28)∗ (0.24)
Δ푙푛(푒푖푡) 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.18
(0.04) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13)
푑푖 × 푡 included included included included
ﬁxed eﬀects included included included included
Const. 0.04 1.72 0.14 0.29
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.56)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗
Overall wage comovements 0.13 -.27 -.57 -.70
when the exchange rate is pegged (0.12) (0.37) (0.51) (0.55)
Obs. 3236 1076 568 298
푅2 0.43 0.21 0.25 0.32
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the wage growth rate as measured by the log change in wages. (2)
The variable Δ 푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) is the wage growth rate of the base country, and 푝푒푔푖푡 is a dummy variable
indicating whether a country pegs its exchange rate to its base country via a currency union or other
arrangements. The variable 푒푖푡 is the bilateral nominal exchange rate between country 푖 and its base
country. (3) The top row indicates the time interval at which the wage growth rates are calculated. (4)
In the row below the constants, each number is the sum of the corresponding coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst
two rows. This number measures the overall wage comovements of countries with peg regimes. (5) The
numbers in the parentheses are clustered standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity across
countries and serial correlation in error terms. (6) *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Eﬀects of the EMU on wage comovements
quarterly annual 2-year 4-year
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) 0.15 -.17 -.31 -.45
(0.1)∗ (0.32) (0.37) (0.41)
퐸푀푈푖푡 ×Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) 0.68 1.02 1.45 1.31
(0.21)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.48)∗∗∗ (0.67)∗
Δ푙푛(푒푖푡) 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.18
(0.04) (0.07) (0.11) (0.14)
푑푖 × 푡 included included included included
ﬁxed eﬀects included included included included
Const. 0.04 2.31 0.15 0.31
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.7)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗
Overall wage comovements 0.83 0.84 1.15 0.87
when the country is in EMU (0.19)
∗∗∗ (0.35)∗∗ (0.48)∗∗ (0.63)
Obs. 3212 1070 564 295
푅2 0.43 0.2 0.24 0.31
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the wage growth rate as measured by the log change in wages. (2)
The variable Δ 푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) is the wage growth rate of the base country, and 퐸푀푈푖푡 is a dummy variable
indicating membership of the European Monetary Union. The variable 푒푖푡 is the bilateral nominal
exchange rate between country 푖 and its base country. (3) The top row indicates the time interval at
which the wage growth rates are calculated. (4) In the row below the constants, each number is the sum
of the corresponding coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst two rows. This number measures the overall wage
comovements of EMU member countries during the euro era. (5) The numbers in the parentheses are
clustered standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity across countries and serial correlation in
error terms. (6) *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Restricting the sample to EMU countries
quarterly annual 2-year 4-year
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) 0.2 0.24 0.17 0.04
(0.07)∗∗∗ (0.24) (0.27) (0.29)
퐸푀푈푖푡 ×Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) 0.65 0.7 1.16 0.89
(0.21)∗∗∗ (0.27)∗∗ (0.4)∗∗∗ (0.5)∗
Δ푙푛(푒푖푡) -.009 0.005 0.02 0.07
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09)
푑푖 × 푡 included included included included
ﬁxed eﬀects included included included included
Const. 0.03 3.48 0.14 0.29
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.58)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗
Overall wage comovements 0.84 0.94 1.33 0.93
when the country is in EMU (0.19)
∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗ (0.58)∗∗ (0.69)
Obs. 1549 446 236 123
푅2 0.35 0.52 0.62 0.69
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the wage growth rate as measured by the log change in wages. (2)
The variable Δ 푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) is the wage growth rate of the base country, and 퐸푀푈푖푡 is a dummy variable
indicating membership of the European Monetary Union. The variable 푒푖푡 is the bilateral nominal
exchange rate between country 푖 and its base country. (3) The top row indicates the time interval at
which the wage growth rates are calculated. (4) In the row below the constants, each number is the sum
of the corresponding coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst two rows. This number measures the overall wage
comovements of EMU member countries during the euro era. (5) The numbers in the parentheses are
clustered standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity across countries and serial correlation in
error terms. (6) *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Restricting the sample to non-EMU countries
quarterly annual 2-year 4-year
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) 0.15 -.31 -.44 -.81
(0.15) (0.32) (0.39) (0.63)
non-CU 푝푒푔푖푡 ×Δ푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) -.01 -.11 -.41 -.82
(0.2) (0.18) (0.43) (0.57)
Δ푙푛(푒푖푡) 0.05 0.1 0.16 0.17
(0.04) (0.08) (0.12) (0.13)
푑푖 × 푡 included included included included
ﬁxed eﬀects included included included included
Const. 0.06 0.53 0.13 0.33
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.62) (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.12)∗∗∗
Overall wage comovements 0.14 -.42 -.85 -1.63
when the exchange rate is pegged (0.29) (0.43) (0.70) (1.14)
Obs. 1830 731 374 187
푅2 0.46 0.18 0.21 0.27
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the wage growth rate as measured by the log change in wages. (2)
The variable Δ 푙푛(푊 ∗푖푡) is the wage growth rate of the base country, and non-CU 푝푒푔푖푡 is a dummy
variable indicating whether a country engages in a peg other than being a member of a currency union.
The variable 푒푖푡 is the bilateral nominal exchange rate between country 푖 and its base country. (3) The
top row indicates the time interval at which the wage growth rates are calculated. (4) In the row below
the constants, each number is the sum of the corresponding coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst two rows. This
number measures the overall wage comovements of countries with non-currency-union pegs. (5) The
numbers in the parentheses are clustered standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity across
countries and serial correlation in error terms. (6) *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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